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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT 0. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
11003

vs.
ETHEL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S APPEAL BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a divorce action between the Respondent
and the Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was first had in this matter on the 15th
day of June, 1965, before the Honorable Thornley
K. Swan in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Utah in and for Davis County, at which
time the Court awarded the respondent a divorce,
granted custody of the three minor children to the
appellant, with an award of child support of $100
per month for each of said children, and awarded
a distribution of the property between the parties,
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which gave the home and the household furnishings
to the appellant in lieu of any periodic alimony;
and fu1·ther ordered that the respondent pay all of
the outstanding family indebtedness existing at that
time, which amounted to $933.56, and $125.00 owing on the automobile awarded to appellant; and
that the respondent was to pay $200.00 of the appellant's attorney's fee.
Subsequent to this judgment the appellant made
a motion for a new trial, which was granted; and
on the 21st day of June, 1966, a second trial was
held before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan in
which evidence was put forth concerning the questions of alimony, support money, property settlement, and grounds for a divorce. And at the conclusion of said trial, the Court entered a judgment
granting a divorce to the respondent, granting custody of the children to the appellant and $100 a '
month support money for each of said children; the
home and furnishings therein were awarded to the
appellant in lieu of any periodic alimony, and a lump
sum amount of $2,400 alimony was awarded to the
appellant with the respondent having the option of
paying it in a lump sum or at the rate of $100 per
month; appellant was awarded one automobile and
the respondent was awarded the other automobile;
and the respondent was ordered to pay the balance
of the family indebtedness existing at the time of
the first judgment, amounting to $933.56, and $100
for the appellant's attorney's fee.
2

RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
Court entered the 6th day of July, 1966, affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the following material, references to the
first trial in 1965 will be ( 65 TR ____ ) and the second trial in 1966 as ( 66 TR ____ ).
The parties were married in Palo Alto, California, in 1940. Five children were born of that marriage, two of which were dependent upon and residing with the appellant at the time of the second trial
in this matter ( 66 TR 4). The children presently
residing with the appellant are Norma, 16 years of
age, and Charles, 13 years of age. The parties have
lived in a home at 3187 South Crestview Circle, in
Bountiful, Utah, since 1950. The home is valued
from $12,000 to $15,000, with a $4,000 indebtedness
still owing, which is payable at $64 per month. The
respondent has for some number of years been employed as an examiner for the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which job requires him to travel extensively throughout the western United States, including Hawaii and Alaska. He has worked various
jobs prior to this employment which usually requires
an accounting education which he does not have ( 66
TR 16-17) . While on the road, he is paid a per diem
of $16 except in Alaska where it is higher. While he
was on the road, he would stay in sub-standard type
accommodations and eat inexpensive meals in order
that he could send part of the per diem home to the
3

appellant ( 66 TR 11). At the time of the trial the
respondent was a Grade 9 in the Civil Service rating
system and had a take-home pay of approximately
$218.65 ( 66 TR 18-19). He also received 10 cents a
mile while operating his automobile in the Government business. The other examiners who work with
him are Grade 11, and he has reached the point that
he cannot rise to a higher grade. ( 66 TR 17).
During the marriage the appellant has worked
full time on several jobs at various times; however,
since 1960 she has not worked full time, but has
worked part-time jobs and was at the time of trial
working a part-time job as a public stenographer.
( 66 TR 39-40). She is trained as a secretary. During their marriage there has been continual arguments concerning finances and concerning the appellant's attitude as exhibited in public towards the
respondent as a provider and as a husband and father ( 66 TR 5-6) . After several years of such quarreling and disagreement, the respondent filed an
action requesting a divorce from the appellant. The
appellant answered and filed a counterclaim asking
for the home and all of the furnishings, $600 per
month alimony and support, and a divorce from the
respondent.
On the 22nd day of March, 1965, an order
awarding temporary alimony and support money
was entered. On the 15th day of June, 1965, a trial
was held by the Honorable Thornley K. Swan, at
which time the appe_llant was represented by a Ver4
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Jen E. Bettilyon. A the beginning of that trial, Mr.
Bettilyon informed the Court that "Well, your Honor, my client does not want to proceed with entering
the grounds for divorce, and we feel under these
ci1·cumstances that we should allow the plaintiff to
proceed to present grounds for divorce. We will
then take the position of not contesting it, with the
knowledge again that this will not influence the
Court's decision as to property division and support
money and alimony" ( 66 TR 2-3). Judgment was
entered after the trial awarding a divorce to the
respondent and granting the appellant custody of
the children plus $100 per child support money, plus
the home and all of the furnishings, and ordering
the respondent to pay all of the then existing obligations other than the mortgage on the house and
furniture, and a portion of the obligation on one of
the cars (R 15-16). Several days after the judgment was entered, the appellant's attorney, Verden
E. Bettilyon, withdrew from the case and Mr. J.
Grant Iverson entered as an appearance for the appellant. The Motion for New Trial was filed complaining that the evidence did not support the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court
granted a new trial, which was held on the 21st day
of June, 1966. Meanwhile, the parties' 18-year-old
son, who had been living with the appellant at
the time of the first trial, became married and set
up a household of his own separate and apart from
the appellant, thus leaving only two minor children
5

in the custody of the appellant. The respondent,
meanwhile, paid the debts which he had been ordered to pay by the Court, which amounted to approximately $933 ( 66 TR 58-59), thus eliminating all
obligations except those on the house and its furnishings.
After the original action had been filed, the
respondent requested more out-of-town assignments
and did receive them, which amounted to him being
away from Salt Lake City approximately 50% to
75% of the time (66 TR 22). Prior to the filing of
the action, however, he was not out of town as much
as he was after he made the above request. During
the first six months of 1966, the appellant made
$1,053.27 as a public stenographer ( 66 TR 39). She
also received $200 per month in support money from
the respondent ( 66 TR 44). She claims that her
average expenses for the period were $519.40 per
month ( 66 TR 44). At the time of the second trial,
the Court allowed the parties to put on evidence concerning the question of alimony, support money and ,
property settlement; and it was understood that the
respondent could produce further testimony in connection with the grounds for the divorce. After the
trial the Court entered judgment accordingly, granting to the respondent a divorce and ordering him to
pay to the appellant $100 per month per child as
support; and in lieu of periodic alimony, the Court
awarded to the appellant the home and all the furnishings therein plus a lump sum alimony of $2,400,
1
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which could be paid at the rate of $100 per month.
The Court also awarded one car to each party and
directed the respondent to pay a part of the appellant's attorney's fees and to pay the balance of any
delinquent family indebtedness which were existing
at the time of the institution of the divorce (R 2627). Appeal was taken from the judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO GRANT A DIVORCE TO THE RESPONDENT AGAINST
THE APPELLANT.

The appellant in this case is in a somewhat
peculiar situation inasmuch as at the beginning of
the first trial the appellant, through her attorney,
Verden E. Bettilyon, apparently conceded that there
was grounds for a divorce, and that the divorce could
be awarded to the respondent. The only issue to be
contested was the distribution of the property and
the determination of support and alimony payments,
if any. Upon the judgment of the Court awarding
no periodic alimony payments, the appellant apparently then decided to contest the grounds of the divorce, which objection was renewed against the second judgment.
There is little question as to the status of the
law upon this point. In many cases in the past this
Court has made it clear that when a marriage is
obviously deteriorated to the point that it would be
7

folly to do otherwise than to dissolve it, the trial
court should grant the divorce. Obviously, no definite standard can be set up as to what must be shown
in order to establish grounds for a divorce. The respondent concedes that a divorce must be based on
more than merely the desire of the parties to be
separated inasmuch as the public has an interest in
whether there exists sufficient ground for the dissolution of the marriage. However, the Court has
made it clear that divorce cases are to be approached
on a pragmatic basis with concern of the de-facto
status of the marriage.
In the present case the respondent alleged that
the appellant had treated him cruelly, causing him
great mental distress. It is the position of the re·
spondent that the evidence is clearly sufficient to
establish that the appellant has in fact caused the '
respondent great mental distress by their constant
arguing and her frequent deprecation of him ( 66
TR 8, 9, 10). The testimony also clearly shows
that the marriage had disintegrated to the point
that it was folly to think that it could be reconstituted. ( 66 TR 35). The uncontroverted evidence
establishes that the parties quarreled continuously
when the respondent was not on the road and was
at home. ( 66 TR 12). There was some variation as
to the cause of these arguments; however, it was
agreed that many of them stemmed from disagreement over financial matters, in particular the propensities of the appellant to spend more money than
1
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was needed, and her apparent lack of appreciation
for the sacrifices of the respondent while on the
road. He testified that they were constantly in debt
and that his wife never seemed to get the bills paid,
even though she would get his pay check plus part
of the per diem with which to pay them. ( 66 TR 7) .
The appellant's answer was always that she was
only spending that which was necessary; however,
he1· concept of what was necessary obviously did not
agree with that of the respondent. He testified that
this constant fighting over finances and his ability
as a breadwinner was a source of great emotional
frustration to him and that when the matter was
discussed with the appellant her attitude was merely
that she couldn't get along on less. ( 66 TR 7) . The
respondent also testified that his wife was constantly inciting him to wrath by digging and cutting remarks directed towards him in public and in private
( 66 TR 8), which, accompanied by the berating
he received from his colleagues while trying to
live frugally on the road, was a source of great
mental distress to him ( 66 TR 11) . He also
states that on one occasion his wife had gone
through his luggage without his permission and had
found some shorts which he had packed to wear at
a physical examination in place of the LDS garments which he normally wore and that she had
confronted him with these shorts and had inferred
that he was involved in an illicit affair while on the
road. ( 66 TR 9-10). He also testified that the appel9

lant besides possessing a domineering personality
was a sloppy housekeeper, that she often was yelling
and screaming at the children ( 66 TR 34), that she
argued and berated the respondent in front of the
children ( 66 TR 12), and that she would sleep a
good part of the day and that it was common practice for him to get up in the morning and take care
of the children and get them fed and off to school
( 66 TR 34). As a result of these arguments with
the appellant and the berating which she heaped
upon him, the respondent testified that he did not
want to spend another minute with her (66 TR 10)
and that he couldn't get away from the house fast
enough ( 66 TR 35) .
The appellant herself testified that there was
serious and continuous quarreling between she and
the respondent ( 66 TR 45). She stated that the 1
arguments were serious in nature ( 66 TR 45) and ,
that in her opinion the arguments were sufficient
to cause a breakup of an average marriage. ( 66 TR
46). She also stated that if she had her way, she
would have all of the respondent's pay check instead
of just part of its as support. (66 TR 48).
It appears obvious that there is sufficient basis
for the trial Court's finding that the respondent had
suffered mental cruelty as a result of his wife's actions and that he accordingly was granted a divorce.
It should be noted that in neither trial did the appellant attempt to establish that the divorce should
be awarded to her and not to the respondent. It
10

would appear that the appellant is not in a position
to argue that the divorce should be granted to her
and that the only question therefore is whether the
facts establish a basis for awarding the appellant a
divorce. A similar situation was presented in the
case of Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 3 Utah 2d 182, 278
Pac. 2d 983 ( 1955), where the wife was questioning
the court's decree granting the husband the divorce.
The evidence there showed that there was constant
fighting between the parties and that the defendant
was of a quarrelsome disposition, that she nagged
him and falsely accused him of laying around, rather than getting up and getting a job immediately
upon his discharge from the Army, that she was
without cause unreasonably suspicious of his conduct, that she searched his pockets and when she
discovered a telephone number in his pockets she
would call and berate whoever answered the phone,
that she embarrassed him by open criticism of his
friends in their presence, and that she was generally
disagreeable and quarrelsome and critical of him
and he found it so intolerable that he wanted to
escape therefrom by re-enlisting in the Army. The
court there affirmed the divorce in behalf of the
husband.
On point also is the case of Curry vs. Curry, 7
Utah 2d 198, 321 Pac. 2d 939 (1958), where the
court laid down the following general test as to the
grounds of mental cruelty:
"There, of course, must be some objective
11

standards upon which to judge whether mental cruelty is made out. But it must also be
realized that what constitutes cruelty to the
extent of causing great mental distress has
considerable subjective content because it depends somewhat upon the sensibilities of the
person complaining and also in a measure
upon the justification, or lack of it, for the
conduct complained of."
(Page 201)
In the present case the record shows that the
appellant was guilty of those actions which are commonly the basis of a finding of mental cruelty in
that she berated and belittled her husband in front
of the children and in public, that she was suspicious
of him and his actions when he was away from home
and would search his belongings in that regard ( 66
TR 9-10), that she did not cooperate with him in
financial matters which were a constant and continuous source of quarrel and argument between the
parties, and that she left much to be desired in the
manner in which she kept up the house and provided
for her husband and children ( 66 TR 34) . The record also clearly shows the existence of the subjective frustration and punishment that respondent incurred as a result of the appellant's actions and that
in fact he suffered great mental pain and distress
because of such actions ( 66 TR 7, 10, 34).
No doubt, this action is similar to all divorce
actions in the sense that the respondent has some
responsibility for the deterioration of the marriage;
however, the question is whether or not the record
12
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indicates sufficient basis for the Court to find a divorce in his favor. It appears clear that the decision
of the Court was well within the wide latitude of
discretion given to the Court in such matters and
that its judgment after having observed the demeanor of the witnesses through two trials should
not be changed or altered by this Court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT
AWARDING THE APPELLANT ANY PERIODIC ALIMONY AND GRANTING IN LIEU
THEREOF THE AMOUNT OF $2,400 PLUS
THE HOUSE AND ALL OF 'THE FURNISHINGS THEREIN.

The appellant questions the actions of the trial
court in not granting periodic alimony. The record
shows, however, that the appellant was fairly compensated considering the facts surrounding this
marriage and the parties' financial conditions. The
Court reviews this issue as it does Point I under the
rule that the findings of the District Court should
not be overruled unless the judgment of the District
Court works a manifest inequity or injustice. Whitehead vs. Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 Pac. 2d
987. And it is also noteworthy that the right to alimony is solely within the discretion of the Court
and that it is payable to either the husband or the
wife depending upon the circumstances. In the case
of Martinett vs. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 Pac.
2d 821 ( 1958) , the Court said in reference to Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
13

authorizes the awarding of alimony, support money,
and distribution of property:

"It is important to note that this statute
makes no distinction between the spouses. It
does not contemplate, nor should there be
any discrimination or inequality of such
a wards on the basis of sex. They may be made
in favor of either spouse, and should be based
upon the needs of the parties and the equities
of the situation being dealt with." (Page 205)
The respondent in this case is not unaware of ,
the needs of the appellant. However, the respondent
agrees with the trial court that those needs were
filled as reasonably and equitably as could be under
the circumstances by the division ordered by the
Court. It should first be noted that the court awarded the following items to the appellant: the house, 1
which had up to $11,000 equity, all of the furnishings
within the house, a car, which the respondent was
to pay $125 towards, a lump sum alimony of $2,400,
child support of $100 per child until they reach their
majority, and in addition to this the respondent was
ordered to pay all of the bills which were existing
against the family at the time the action was filed,
which amounted to approximately $1,000 and $300
attorney's fees. This is certainly not a case where
the husband is absconding with the fruits of the
marriage; in fact, it becomes obvious that he has
been left with nothing but his own ability to continue in his job and make a living for himself. It
is of interest to note that the appellant claims that
14

she requires approximately $520 a month in which
to take care of herself and the two children and that
the amount did not change when the third child left
home. Common experience indicates that this is more
than is necessai·y for the appellant and two children
and that with proper management less money would
be required for the average monthly expenses. Her
inability to manage money contributed to the break
up of the marriage and now is being asserted by appellant as reason for more money from the respondent. The intentions of the appellant are possibly
revealed in he1· statement on page 49 of the 66
Transcript where in response to the question of
whether or not she realized that the average family
income was not $500 a month, she replied, "Well,
Chris isn't making what an average man makes."
Obviously, the truth is in this case that the appellant could get along on less money but that she
wants as big a cut out of the respondent's pay check
as possible.
The Court found that the income of the respondent was approximately $218.65 every two weeks,
exclusive, of course, of the per diem and mileage
and any overtime. The Court, however, properly excluded consideration of the per diem inasmuch as
the purpose of the per diem as evidenced by the
Government regulations put in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit E was to provide for the dignified
existence of the employee while away from home,
and thus in the Government's view and properly
15

unde1· the Court's view should not be considered as
income to the recipient. Thus, under that finding
the respondent would be receiving approximately a
net of $436 a month, and that as long as he was paying the support payments his income would be approximately $236, which does not meet the $267 per
month requirement which he testified he had to get
along on per month ( 66 TR 13). The Court expressed the desire that under the circumstances of this
case he did not want to saddle the respondent with
periodic alimony payments ( 66 TR 58). The record
also shows that the appellant is a qualified secretary,
that she could get employment, and that she at the
present time did have employment which was paying
her on the average $163 a month for the six months
prior to the second trial ( 66 TR 44). The trial
court's attitude obviously was that the appellant
was awarded sufficient property and support payments to take care of her minimum requirements
and that she would have to go to work in order to
maintain herself at a reasonable standard. It surely
is not an abuse of discretion for the Court to expect
the appellant to go to work where her past indicates
a history of employment and where she is capable of
perf arming such work. The Court was liberal in the
property settlement and in the support award, and
did, in fact, award alimony to the appellant. One
would get the impression from her position on appeal that alimony was completely forgotten. It can
hardly be said that the trial Court was unreasonable
16
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in lieu of periodic alimony granted appellant the
home and the amount of $2,400, which could be paid
in a lump payment or at $100 per month which thus
would provide $100 per month alimony for a period
of two years. The appellant argues that the award
must be such that there will be a guarantee that the
appellant will not at some future time go onto the
welfare rolls of the county. This is a facetious argument, for although it is a consideration that the
Court must make, it cannot go so far into the future
as to guarantee the financial security of the parties
involved in a divorce. Under the award granted by
the Court, there is no reason why the appellant
should ever be on the welfare rolls. It is not the role
of the Court to be a soothsayer, but rather to make an
equitable settlement determining at the time of decision the present and predictable future needs of
the parties tempered by the circumstances of the
case and the finances available.
The respondent respectfully submits that the
Court awarded approximately $20,000 to the appellant in property and lump sum alimony, and in addition to that, awarded support payments for the
children which will last for at least five or six years
to come until the youngest child has reached his
majority. The respondent has cleared all of the family debts except those on the house and furnishings
and has obviously left the appellant in as good a
position as could be provided under the economic situation of these parties. A statement of the Court at
17

the conclusion of the trial was supported by the find,
ings of fact and is therefore set out below in order
to further inform the Court of the basis of the trial
court's thinking and subsequent decision:
"This defendant has demonstrated to this
Court, from the evidence, that the plaintiff
could not satisfy her financial needs, and I
do!1't believe she'd be satisfied with anything
t~1s C~urt could provide for her, with plaintiff bemg the source of those needs. I think
she spoke somewhat facetiously, but somewhat correctly, when nothing short of all
could really satisfy her ( 66 TR 56) ."
The Court then continued on to say:
"The Court is impressed with Mr. Garrett's argument that there must be a cut off
between these parties on this financial payment. The Court attempted to meet that by
its former rulings; and found previously that
the award of all the property, and the liberal
support award was made to the plaintiff, or
to the defendant, in lieu of any alimony. Furthermore, that the plaintiff was burdened
with a large sum of obligations, of outstanding debts and obligations, incurred during the
marriage which he has now paid. He has met
this responsibility, and I don't think he should
be penalized for it. vVell, this Court is not go- )
ing to saddle this plaintiff, under the facts ~f
this case with a permanent award for alimony. Again I point out that the Court has
been very liberal in the property settlement
award, giving it all to the defendant, and has
granted a very liberal support money award.
It was foreseeable that defendant would have
a period of time with her son Robert living at
18

home, that she would be receiving $100 a
month fo1· him to apply on the household expenses. In light of the testimony, and the
needs of the defendant, the Court will award
defendant a lump sum alimony in the sum of
$2,400. That will be payable either in cash or
at the rate of $100 a month, whichever best
suits the defendant, or the plaintiff's ability
to pay; there being no interest if it is a monthly payment, or no discount if it is a cash payment. ( 66 TR 58-59) ."
CONCLUSION
This divorce action was instituted by the respondent after a period of separation. Appellant
did not want the divorce. Even though at the pretrial of this case it was determined that she would
put on evidence in support of her counterclaim, she
refused to do so at the time of trial and offered no
evidence as to grounds for divorce on the second
ti'ial of the action. She was content to have respondent's entire pay check and a substantial portion of
the per diem permitted him as a Government employee. All she has ever wanted from respondent is
money, and she was content that he be away from
home a major portion of the time. The foundation
of her appeal in this case is financial. She wants
nominal alimony. This may appear to be innocuous,
but her real motive is to continue her financial
slranglehold on respondent. Were the Court to grant
the relief she asks, it would only be a matter of a
short time before the Court would be asked to in19

crease the award, and this would become an endlessly litigated matter.
Affirmatively, the record shows that the appellant received all of the property the parties had
accumulated during their marriage; received a generous amount for child support and a lump sum of
$2,400 in lieu of alimony. The Decree of Divorce in
favor of respondent was supported by sufficient
evidence, and clearly the trial court did not abuse
discretion in the property settlement.
The Decree in the lower court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Atorneys for
Plaintif!-Respondent
By
Edward M. Garrett
W. Brent Wilcox
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